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Short Selling and Firms’ Disclosure of Bad News: 
Evidence from Regulation SHO 
ABSTRACT 
As informed traders, short sellers enhance the informativeness of stock prices, especially 
related to bad news, potentially reducing the benefits and increasing the litigation and 
reputational costs of withholding bad news by managers. We exploit a quasi-natural 
experimental setting provided by the introduction of SEC regulation SHO (Reg-SHO), which 
significantly reduced the constraints faced by short sellers for an effectively randomly selected 
subsample of U.S. firms (pilot firms). Relative to control firms, we find pilot firms increase the 
likelihood of voluntary bad news management forecasts; provide these forecasts in a more timely 
manner; and accelerate the release of quarterly bad earnings news. Each of these effects is 
stronger for subsamples of moderate (compared with extreme) bad news, firms facing high 
(relative to low) litigation risks, and firms with a forecasting history. Similar effects are not 
observed for voluntary good news forecasts. A range of robustness tests reinforce our results. 
 
Keywords: short selling, voluntary disclosure, litigation risk  
JEL Classification: G14, D22, K22, K41, M40 
INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we investigate whether short selling influences the disclosure of bad news 
by firms. We exploit a quasi-natural experimental setting provided by the introduction of SEC 
regulation SHO (Reg-SHO), which significantly reduced the constraints faced by short sellers for 
a subsample of U.S. firms, and investigate whether this was associated with changes in the 
voluntary disclosure of bad news by firms. We focus on three dimensions of voluntary 
disclosure: the likelihood that bad news is voluntarily disclosed by firms, the timing of any 
voluntarily disclosed bad news, and the timing of mandatory quarterly earnings releases when 
the earnings news is bad. 
Managers have incentives to withhold and/or delay the release of bad news (e.g., 
Acharya, DeMarzo, and Kremer 2011; Bao, Kim, Mian, and Su 2018; Clinch and Verrecchia 
2015; Dye 1985; Jung and Kwon 1988; Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki 2009; Verrecchia 1983, 






news held privately by informed traders is reflected in stock prices. Short sellers represent 
informed traders and their actions assist in impounding negative news more quickly into stock 
prices directly via their trading activities (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia 1987), and indirectly 
through the public availability of short interest information (e.g., Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan, 
and Balachandran 2002; Diether, Lee, and Werner 2009b; Senchack and Starks 1993). Because 
short sellers and managers likely have overlapping information sets (e.g., Massa, Qian, Xu, and 
Zhang 2015a; Massa, Zhang, and Zhang 2015b), this can affect both the benefits and costs to 
firms/managers of withholding the disclosure of bad news. Any benefit to managers from 
withholding bad information will likely be reduced since at least some of their information will 
already be reflected in price, or will soon be reflected, through the actions of short sellers. 
Regarding costs, prior research indicates that litigation and reputational costs play an important 
role in managers’ bad news disclosure decisions (e.g., Field, Lowry, and Shu 2005; Kothari et al. 
2009; Skinner 1994, 1997). And uncertainty whether firms possess private information assists 
them in withholding bad news (e.g., Dye 1985; Jung and Kwon 1988). To the extent that short 
selling causes prices to already, or imminently, reflect some bad news held by managers, it will 
be more difficult for managers to claim they do not possess that bad news. Consequently, if 
managers withhold bad news, such an action will be more likely to be detected and lead to higher 
litigation and reputational costs.  Combining these two effects — a reduction in benefits and an 
increase in costs associated with withholding bad news — suggests that short selling will 
motivate greater and more timely disclosure of bad news by firms. 
In this paper, we exploit an exogenous shock to short selling activities to investigate this 
prediction. In July 2004, the SEC adopted Rule 202T of Reg-SHO, which established procedures 






listed stocks and the bid test for Nasdaq National Market stocks) — a short sale constraint — on 
short selling in U.S. equity markets, in order for the SEC to study the effectiveness of the tests.1 
Under the Reg-SHO pilot program short sale constraints were suspended for a subset of 
(effectively) randomly selected firms (pilot firms), while short sale constraints remained 
unchanged for other firms (control firms).2  As a result, around the announcement date short 
interest significantly increased for pilot firms compared to control firms (Grullon, Michenaud, 
and Weston 2015), consistent with Reg-SHO having a substantial effect on short selling 
activities for pilot firms. Managers also appeared sensitive to such effects on their firms. For 
instance, in a 2008 NYSE survey, the majority of top executives surveyed were in favour of re-
instituting the price tests as soon as possible (Grullon et al. 2015). Therefore, the exogenous 
shock to short sale constraints along with the effective randomization of treatment/pilot firms 
under Reg-SHO provides an attractive quasi-natural experimental setting within which to 
examine the potential causal effect of short selling on corporate bad news disclosure.  
We focus on the disclosure of bad earnings news by firms and investigate three aspects of 
voluntary disclosure via difference-in-differences (DiD) comparisons of pilot vs. control firms 
before, during and after the pilot program.  During the pilot program, for the full sample of firms, 
we observe a significant increase, approximately 5%, in the likelihood of bad news management 
forecasts among the pilot firms. Managers also provide these forecasts in a more timely fashion, 
                                                 
1 In 1938, the NYSE adopted an uptick rule, Rule 10a-1, known as the “tick test”. The rule requires that a short sale 
cannot be completed if the current bid price is below the most recently traded price (plus tick). In 1994, the 
NASDAQ also adopted its own price test under Rule 3350, requiring a short sale to occur at a price one penny above 
the current bid price if the current bid price is a downtick from previous bid. The purpose of these tests is to prevent 
short sellers from participating in market manipulation that forces prices downward. 
2 According to the Rule 202T’s pilot program, stocks in the Russell 3000 index as of June 25, 2004 were ranked by 
average daily dollar volume of trade over the one year prior to the issuance of Reg-SHO from highest to lowest for 
the period. Within each exchange — American Stock Exchange, New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ — every 
third ranked stock was drawn from the pool and assigned to the pilot group, resulting in a pilot group (comprising 
986) stocks and a control group (comprised of all the remaining stocks in the Russell 3000 index). From May 2, 
2005 to August 6, 2007, pilot stocks were exempted from short-sale price tests, and after August, 2007, the SEC 






on average approximately 2 days earlier. Additionally, we find that managers accelerate the 
release of mandatory quarterly earnings news when the news is bad, on average approximately 
0.2 days earlier.  Moreover, the results are stronger for the subset of bad news disclosures 
representing less extreme bad news, where changes to short selling prohibitions are more likely 
to have an effect at the margin. The results are also generally stronger for the subset of firms 
drawn from higher litigation risk/cost industries (e.g., Field et al. 2005; Skinner 1994, 1997), as 
would be expected, although there is some sensitivity to the approach used to measure litigation 
risk. These results provide strong and consistent support for a link between short selling and the 
voluntary disclosure of bad news by firms.  
We conduct several additional analyses. Previous research (e.g., Billings, Jennings, and 
Lev 2015; Field et al. 2005; Rogers and Van Buskirk 2013) indicates that firms’ prior forecasting 
behavior is an important factor in explaining their subsequent voluntary forecasting decisions. To 
investigate the role of prior forecasting behavior on our results, we divide our sample into three 
groups: firms which did not forecast earnings in the period prior to the announcement of the 
Regulation SHO pilot program; firms which issued less than or equal to three earnings forecasts 
in the pre-Regulation SHO period; and firms which issued greater than three earnings forecasts 
in the pre-Regulation SHO period. Only firms who had issued more than three earnings forecasts 
exhibit statistically significant effects of Regulation SHO on three dimensions of voluntary 
forecasting we study. This is consistent with Regulation SHO only having an impact on firms 
whose prior forecasting behavior suggests were on the margin in terms of the costs and benefits 
associated with voluntary forecasting.     
We also find that the effects of Reg-SHO on the likelihood and timing of bad news 






reactions when the Reg-SHO pilot program was first announced, consistent with the disclosure 
changes being causally linked to the regulatory change in short-selling. Finally, to rule out the 
possibility that our findings are due to a change in managerial disclosure in general (both good 
news and bad news), we examine the effects of Reg-SHO on good news disclosure. We find 
marginally significant evidence of a decrease in the likelihood of good news disclosure by pilot 
firms and no significant difference in the timing of good news disclosures between pilot and 
control firms during the pilot program period. Thus our findings for bad news disclosure do not 
appear attributable to a change in firms’ disclosure of all news.  
We demonstrate that our main results remain qualitatively unchanged for a series of 
robustness tests. First, following Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013), we use an alternative 
definition of management  forecast news to classify bad news forecasts, correcting for the 
potential bias of conventional management forecasts news when applied to forecasts bundled 
with earnings announcements. Second, we control for the bundling factor in the regressions of 
the timing of bad news forecasts to mitigate the concern that a reduced delay in earnings 
announcements mechanically leads to more timely forecasts for those bundled. Third, to address 
the possibility that our main findings—the difference in disclosure behavior between pilot and 
control firms during Reg-SHO pilot program — are due to chance, we conduct sensitivity 
analyses using randomly generated pseudo “pilot firms”  and a pseudo “pilot program period”  
and find no significant results. Finally, as Grullon et al. (2015) find that pilot firms significantly 
reduce equity issuance during Reg-SHO, it is possible that our results may be due to a decrease 
in external financing needs in pilot firms.  To mitigate this concern, we partition sample firms 
based on whether firms issue equity in the subsequent year and find that our results hold in non-






 In summary, our study provides evidence that short selling does influence the disclosure 
of bad news by firms – the likelihood of issuing bad news earnings forecasts, the timing of those 
forecasts, and the timing of bad news earnings releases.  All three effects are apparent for our full 
sample, but concentrated in firms with moderately bad news, firms facing high litigation risk, 
and firms with an already relatively high (pre-Regulation SHO) likelihood of issuing earnings 
forecasts. Our research complements previous research on the influence of short selling on other 
major corporate decisions which suggests that short sellers mitigate manager-investor agency 
problems by curbing earnings management (e.g., Fang, Huang, and Karpoff 2016; Massa et al. 
2015b), deterring financial misconduct (e.g., Karpoff and Lou 2010), and enhancing investment 
efficiency (e.g., Chang, Lin, and Ma 2014; He and Tian 2014).  In addition, our findings of more 
bad news disclosure by pilot firms are consistent with higher auditor fees charged to these firms 
to hedge against down-side risk (Hope, Hu, and Zhao 2017). Finally, our finding of more timely 
disclosure of bad news by managers is also in line with the findings from related research 
regarding analysts’ forecasting behaviour.  Ke, Lo, Sheng, and Zhang (2018) show that the 
lifting of short-selling constraints in Regulation SHO improves analysts’ forecast quality via both 
a “disciplining effect” (stronger incentives for analysts to uncover bad news) and an 
“information effect” (enhanced price informativeness via more active short selling). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the relevant 
regulatory background and develop our hypotheses. We also discuss two recent papers (Li and 
Zhang 2015 and Chen, Cheng, Luo and Yue 2014) that employ the Reg-SHO pilot program to 
investigate the link between firms’ voluntary disclosure policies and short selling, but  differ 






the sample and our research design, while section 5 presents our results. We conclude in section 
6. 
RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES 
The background of Reg-SHO 
In July 2004, the SEC adopted Rule 202T of Reg-SHO, which established procedures for 
the SEC to temporarily suspend any short sale price test for a subset of firms (the pilot firms), 
while short sale constraints remained unchanged for other firms (the control firms). According to 
Rule 202T’s pilot program, stocks in the Russell 3000 index as of June 25, 2004 were ranked by 
average daily dollar volume of trade over the one year period prior to the issuance of Reg-SHO 
from highest to lowest for the period. Within each exchange — American Stock Exchange, New 
York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ — every third ranked stock was drawn from the pool and 
designated a member of the pilot group, resulting in a pilot group comprising 986 stocks and a 
control group comprised of all the remaining stocks in the Russell 3000 index.  
From May 2, 2005 to July 6, 2007, pilot stocks were exempted from short-sale price tests, 
and after August, 2007, the SEC repealed the price test rule on short selling for all stocks.  
However, the removal of short-sale price tests was not welcomed by managers and exchanges. In 
a 2008 NYSE survey, 85% of top executives surveyed were in favour of re-instituting the price 
tests as soon as possible (Grullon et al. 2015). Various parties including law firms, members of 
congress and journalists blamed the SEC for the 2007/08 financial crisis in part because of 
increased short selling. Under this pressure, on February 24, 2010, SEC restored a modified 
uptick rule that is triggered when a security’s price declines by 10% or more from the previous 






The potential impact of Reg-SHO on bad news disclosure 
Managers have various incentives to withhold bad earnings-related news and avoid the 
resulting negative stock price effects (e.g., Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005; Kothari et al. 
2009). They also bear potentially large costs when investors are surprised by large negative news 
on earnings announcement dates (Skinner 1994). Managers can be sued for not releasing adverse 
earnings surprises promptly. They may also incur reputational costs for failing to disclose bad 
news in a timely manner. Those firms with poor reporting reputations are less likely to be 
followed by analysts and money managers, which reduces the price and/or liquidity of their 
firms’ stocks (Skinner 1994). 
Short selling likely influences both the benefits and costs to managers associated with 
their decision to disclose or withhold bad news. Prior studies suggest that short sellers are 
informed investors and their information set overlaps managers’ private information.  Greater 
short interest is associated with poor future performance, negative earnings surprises and 
managerial financial misconduct (e.g., Christophe, Ferri, and Angel 2004; Diether, Lee, and 
Werner 2009a; Karpoff and Lou 2010). Thus, an increase in abnormal short interest is often 
perceived as a bad signal to market participants (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia 1987), and stock 
prices fall in response to the announcement of an increase in short interest (e.g., Aitken, Frino, 
McCorry, and Swan 1998).  As a result, stock prices already likely incorporate at least partially 
the undisclosed upcoming bad news withheld by managers, reducing the benefits from 
withholding disclosure.3 
                                                 
3 Consistent with this argument, Karpoff and Lou (2010) report evidence that for firms that are experiencing 
financial misconduct, those with high abnormal short interest are publicly revealed 8 months earlier than firms with 






On the cost side, since managers’ ability to withhold  unfavourable news is constrained 
by investors’ beliefs about their possession of private information (e.g., Dye 1985; Jung and 
Kwon 1988), it will be harder for managers to hide bad news and claim “no news” when 
investors’ beliefs are updated via new information from short selling. As a result, managers are 
likely to face larger litigation and reputational costs if they continue withholding bad news 
(Trueman 1997). 
In summary, in the presence of short selling managers are likely to face lower 
incremental benefits from withholding bad news and higher potential litigation and reputational 
costs, leading to increased and more timely disclosure of bad earnings news. 
The introduction of Reg-SHO acted as an exogenous shock to short selling constraints for 
the pilot firms. The reduction in constraints led to a marked increase in short selling for firms in 
the Reg-SHO pilot group. Diether et al. (2009b) report an 8 percent increase in intraday short 
sales immediately following the implementation date of the pilot program on May 2, 2005. 
Similarly, Grullon et al. (2015) document a 19 percent increase in monthly short interest for pilot 
firms around the announcement date of Reg-SHO compared to control firms. These findings 
provide evidence that the removal of short sale price tests under Reg-SHO was significant 
enough to materially affect the extent of short selling activity, and suggest that the increase in 
short selling pressure for pilot firms could affect managerial decisions. Relating to the disclosure 
of bad earnings news, we expect that the enhanced threat from short selling motivated managers 
of pilot firms to release bad news voluntarily through management earnings forecasts more so 






H1:  During the Reg-SHO pilot period, firms in the pilot group were more likely to 
disclose bad news through management earnings forecasts compared to those in the 
control group.  
 Prior research also indicates that managers not only have incentives to withhold bad 
news, they also delay the voluntary disclosure of bad news (e.g., Kothari et al. 2009).  As 
discussed above, since short selling is likely to reduce the incentives for managers to withhold 
bad news, we expect short selling to similarly reduce managers’ incentive to delay the voluntary 
release of bad news:   
H2:  During the Reg-SHO pilot period, firms in the pilot group accelerated the release of 
bad news management earnings forecasts compared to those in the control group. 
Finally, turning to mandatory earnings announcements, prior research documents that 
managers may deliberately delay the release of (mandatory) earnings news which is unfavorable 
(e.g., Bagnoli, Kross, and Watts 2002; Begley and Fischer 1998; Chambers and Penman 1984; 
Cohen, Dey, Lys, and Sunder 2007). As discussed above, Reg-SHO enhances the 
informativeness of stock prices with respect to negative news for pilot firms, which reduces the 
information asymmetry between investors and firm managers.  Due to increased short-selling, 
investors of pilot firms are likely aware of/anticipate the upcoming bad earnings news.  As a 
result, there is less incentive for managers to delay the earnings release. Instead, they may 
accelerate the earnings announcement to build a reputation for transparent reporting or to reduce 







H3:    During the Reg-SHO pilot period, firms in the pilot group accelerated the release of 
bad earnings news compared to those in the control group.  
Two related papers 
Two recent papers (Li and Zhang 2015 and Chen et al. 2014) also employ the Reg-SHO 
pilot program to investigate the link between firms’ voluntary disclosure policies and short 
selling, but  differ from our research both in their predictions and in some of their results. Li and 
Zhang (2015) focus on the effect of short-selling on the precision of management bad news 
earnings forecasts and the readability of bad news annual reports. They first suggest that short 
selling increases the magnitude of stock price reaction to the public release of bad news 
management earnings forecasts, and provide empirical evidence consistent with this expectation. 
They argue that, as a result, firms face increased costs to voluntarily disclosing bad news 
forecasts (due to the greater negative price response to disclosure). Consequently, they predict 
that pilot firms will respond to Reg-SHO by decreasing their voluntary disclosure of bad news 
earnings forecasts and/or decreasing the precision of their bad news forecasts via wider range 
forecasts, and by decreasing the readability of bad news annual reports. They find no evidence of 
a change in likelihood of bad news forecasts by pilot firms, but report evidence consistent with 
their other two predictions.  
In an unpublished paper, Chen, Cheng, Luo, and Yue (2014) focus on the effect of short-
selling on the disclosure of good news management earnings forecasts. They predict that pilot 
firms will respond to Reg-SHO by increasing the voluntary disclosure of good news earnings 
forecasts in order to discourage short sellers. They argue that short selling imposes costs on 






and so discourages their attention. They report evidence consistent with their prediction. They 
also argue that the likely impact of Reg-SHO on the disclosure of bad news forecasts by firms is 
ambiguous, and find no evidence of an effect. 
 Our research differs from both Li and Zhang (2015) and Chen et al. (2014) in a number 
of respects. Like Li and Zhang (2015), but unlike Chen et al. (2014), we focus on bad news 
disclosure because prior research suggests that managers have incentives to withhold bad news, 
but not good news, and because short selling generally is associated with unfavourable news. 
Second, our predictions and results regarding the effect of Reg-SHO on the likelihood of bad 
news earnings forecast disclosure by firms differ from those of Li and Zhang (2015) and Chen et 
al. (2014). We predict and find that pilot firms will increase the likelihood of bad news 
disclosure during the Reg-SHO period. In contrast, Li and Zhang (2015) predict a decrease in the 
likelihood of bad news disclosure, while Chen et al. (2014) make no prediction. Both Li and 
Zhang (2015) and Chen et al. (2014) report insignificant results relating to this. Third, in addition 
to the likelihood of bad news forecast disclosure, we broaden the spectrum of corporate 
disclosure decisions to include the effect of Reg-SHO on the timing of such voluntary 
disclosures, and the timeliness of bad news (mandatory) earnings announcements. Our results 
indicate that Reg-SHO affected all of these dimensions of firm disclosure in a consistent manner. 
Fourth, we investigate several factors associated with how short selling affects firms’ disclosure 
behavior. In particular, our results indicate that the effect of Reg-SHO on the disclosure of bad 
news by firms is concentrated in firms with moderately bad news, firms facing high litigation 







In addition, we are able to resolve, to a significant extent, inconsistencies between our 
results and those in Li and Zhang (2015) and Chen et al. (2014). Specifically, for our full sample, 
we report a statistically significant effect of Regulation SHO on the likelihood of firms issuing a 
bad news earnings forecast. In contrast, both Li and Zhang (2015) and Chen et al. (2014) report a 
corresponding statistically insignificant effect for the likelihood of bad news management 
earnings forecasts. To investigate this difference, we conducted a detailed replication of both 
papers’ sample selection procedures and research design choices.4,5 The results indicate that the 
difference is primarily attributable to the inclusion or exclusion of firms’ prior forecasting 
behaviour as an explanatory/control variable.  Previous research has indicated that firms’ prior 
forecasting behaviour is an important factor in explaining subsequent disclosure choices (e.g., 
Billings et al. 2015; Field et al. 2005; Rogers and Van Buskirk 2013). We find in our replication 
that when prior forecasting behavior is included as a control variable there is a statistically 
significant effect of Regulation SHO on the likelihood of firms issuing a bad news earnings 
forecast. When prior forecasting behavior is not included as a control (as in Li and Zhang 2015, 
and Chen et al. 2014) there is no statistically significant effect. However, the inclusion or 
exclusion of firms’ prior forecasting behavior as a control does not affect our results for the 
timing of bad news earnings forecasts and bad news earnings releases, nor any of our subsample 
results.6 
                                                 
4 Details of the full replication procedures and results are available in the online appendix. 
5 Chen et al. (2014) also report a significant increase in good news earnings forecasts for pilot firms. However, Li 
and Zhang (2015) report no difference between pilot and control firms in the likelihood of good news management 
forecasts during the Reg-SHO period. We also find no difference for our sample. 
6 Note that the importance of the omission/inclusion of prior forecasting behaviour on the replicated results suggests 
that the difference-in-difference research design we, Li and Zhang (2015), and Chen et al. (2014) employ does not 
result in completely effective ex post randomisation of some firm characteristics between pilot and control firms, 






Some differences do remain between our research and Li and Zhang (2015). They predict 
and find that pilot firms decrease the precision of range earnings forecasts and decrease the 
readability of bad news annual reports during the Reg-SHO period. These results appear to be 
inconsistent with the increased disclosure of bad news earnings forecasts by pilot firms that we 
document.7 
SAMPLE SELECTION 
Panel A of Table 1 summarizes our sample selection process. We begin with the Russell 
index as of June 2004. On July 28, 2004, the SEC announced that out of the Russell 3000, 986 
stocks would trade without any price test restrictions applied to short sales during the term of 
pilot program.8 Following the SEC requirement, we exclude stocks that are not listed on the 
NYSE, AMEX or Nasdaq, and also those that went private or had spin-offs after April 30, 2004. 
As a result we identify 986 pilot firm stocks (the pilot group) according to the published list of 
the SEC’s pilot order and 1986 non-pilot firm stocks (the control group).9  
We obtain financial statement data from COMPUSTAT, institutional ownership data 
(form 13F) from the Thomson-Reuters CDA/spectrum database, and analyst following 
information from the I/B/E/S detail files. The quarterly EPS management forecast data is 
provided by the I/B/E/S guidance feed database.10  We define the Reg-SHO pilot period 
                                                 
7 We investigated the precision of range earnings forecasts for our sample and found, contrary to Li and Zhang’s 
(2015) results, no significant difference between pilot and control firms during the Reg-SHO period. One potential 
explanation for this is that Li and Zhang (2015) include the period between announcement of Reg-SHO and its 
implementation in the pre-regulation period. In contrast, we separate this transition period out from the pre-
regulation period based on prior Reg-SHO research that indicates that short interest changed for pilot firms relative 
to control firms during the transition period (e.g., Grullon et al. 2015). When we include the transition period in the 
pre-regulation period our results change and are consistent with those reported by Li and Zhang (2015). 
8 Details of the pilot list are available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/34-50104.htm. 
9 The total number of firms in our sample at this step is 2960, comparable to the 2952 identified by Fang et al. 
(2016).  
10 Li and Zhang (2015) and Chen et al. (2014) both use the First Call CIG database as the source for management 






(DURSHO) as the period from May 2, 2005 to July 6, 2007, when the pilot program was in 
place. We choose December 1st 2002 – July 28th 2004 as the pre-treatment period (PRESHO) to 
match approximately the length of the two periods.11 The period between the announcement of 
the pilot program and its implementation (July 29th 2004 through May 1st 2005) is the transition 
period (TRANSITION). We also examine whether the effect of Reg-SHO on management 
forecasts diminishes after August 2007, when the uptick rule was also suspended for the control 
group. We choose the post SHO implementation period (POSTSHO) as the period from August 
2007 to July 2009 for the tests of the likelihood and timing of bad news management forecasts 
(hypotheses 1 and 2). For tests of the delay in bad news earnings announcements (hypothesis 3) 
we choose POSTSHO as August 2008 to July 2010 because we require earnings announcement 
dates for the same quarter in the previous year under the same regulation regime to calculate our 
expected delay metric (see below).12,13  
Following related research (e.g., Diether et al. 2009b; Grullon et al. 2015), firms with a 
price less than $1 are excluded from the sample. We further require each firm-quarter to have all 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
immediately preceding consensus analyst earnings forecast associated with each management forecast, while CIG 
does not. Thus, using CIG requires researchers to match management forecasts to consensus analyst forecasts. This 
is a potential source of difference in the classification of management forecasts into good and bad news (relative to 
the consensus analyst forecast). To investigate the effect of this on our results, we obtained management forecasts 
for the PRESHO, TRANSITION, and DURSHO periods from the CIG database. There were 8,325 firm-quarters in 
our sample that had management forecasts in both I/B/E/S and CIG for these periods. Of those, 6.7 percent yielded 
different bad and good news forecast classifications between I/B/E/S and CIG. We repeated our analyses using CIG 
management forecasts with no material effect on our reported results.  
11 SEC announced the Reg-SHO on July 29th, 2004, while the complete management earnings forecast data is only 
available from December, 2002. 
12 We also reran the tests using August 2007- July 2009 as POSTSHO and found a significant difference between 
pilot and control firms in the delay of bad news earnings announcements. This may suggest the influence of 
measurement error in the “expected delay of earnings announcement”, and/or a prolonged effect of Reg-SHO on 
pilot firms. 
13 On September 19, 2008, the SEC imposed an emergency short selling ban on 799 financial firms. To investigate 
the potential effect of this on our results we excluded firm-quarters from July 2008 through June 2009 from our 






control variables available (as described in the following section).  Following Anilowski, Feng, 
and Skinner (2007), we exclude non-EPS forecasts and require management forecasts to be made 
before the earnings announcement and not more than 90 days before the fiscal quarter end. To 
measure the analyst consensus, we use the item Mean_at_date (analyst forecast consensus at the 
time of guidance), provided by the I/B/E/S Guidance Feed database.  
For tests of the timing of earnings announcements (hypothesis 3), we require each firm-
quarter to have an actual quarterly earnings report date (RDQ) from COMPUSTAT for quarter q 
of year t and year t-1. Following Bagnoli et al. (2002), we eliminate earnings announcements 
with actual report dates more than 60 calendar days before or 90 calendar days after the expected 
announcement date (the earnings report date in the same quarter of the previous year). These 
restrictions reduce our sample by less than 1% and reduce the likelihood of data entry errors in 
our sample data.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Panel B of Table 1 describes the industry membership of firms in our sample and 
indicates a broad cross-section of industries are represented. Only one industry represents more 
than 10 percent of firms in our sample (SIC code 73 Business Services at 10.4 percent of the 
sample). 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
We employ a difference-in-difference approach, using Reg-SHO as the quasi-natural 
experiment to identify the causal effect of the regulation’s change in short selling constraints on 






earnings forecasts, the horizon of bad news forecasts, and the timing of bad news earnings 
announcements between pilot firms and control firms before, during and after the pilot program. 
Measurement of disclosure properties 
The likelihood of bad news management earnings forecasts 
Following Anilowski et al. (2007), we classify a management earnings forecast as a bad 
news forecast if the forecast is less than the prevailing analysts’ consensus earnings estimate.14 
The majority of our sample forecasts are issued in range and point forms. We use the mid-point 
of the range (for a range forecast) to measure the forecast value. For open-range management 
forecasts, the forecast is classified as bad news if the upper boundary is lower than the analyst 
consensus.15 The analyst consensus is provided by the I/B/E/S Guidance Feed database (item 
Mean_at_date).16 We use an indicator, BADNEWS, to capture whether firms disclose bad news 
in a firm-quarter. If managers provide at least one bad news forecast during a firm-quarter, then 
BADNEWS is one and zero otherwise.17  
The timing of bad news management earnings forecasts 
To reflect the timeliness of bad news forecasts issued by managers, we compute the 
forecast horizon. Following Rogers and Van Buskirk (2009), we define MF_HORIZON_BAD as 
                                                 
14 We repeated our analyses after eliminating bad news forecasts in the top decile by magnitude of all negative 
management forecast errors. We also eliminated possible low ball management forecasts (defined as in Chen 2014). 
Our main results were qualitatively similar for these tests.  
15 Inferences are unchanged if we exclude management forecasts where the magnitude of the forecast news (scaled 
by stock price at the beginning of the quarter) is in the bottom quintile of the sample distribution. 
16 Using the I/B/E/S detail history file, we also computed the analyst consensus based upon individual analyst 
forecasts provided 90 days before the management forecast date. Using this measure of analyst consensus yields 
results qualitatively similar to those we report below.  
17 In our sample, 65% of management quarterly EPS forecasts are issued once in a quarter. Therefore, multiple 
management forecasts are a minority. Nevertheless, in untabulated robustness checks, we employed both the 
proportion of bad news forecasts to all forecasts in a quarter and the number of bad news forecasts in a quarter as 






the length of time between when the forecast was released and the end date of the fiscal period 
being forecasted. Increasing the horizon of a forecast is consistent with managers providing more 
timely information to the market, i.e., releasing the information earlier. If a firm issues multiple 
bad news forecasts for a fiscal quarter, we choose the first forecast to compute 
MF_HORIZON_BAD.18   
The timeliness of bad news mandatory earnings announcements  
Following previous research (e.g., Bagnoli et al. 2002; Brown, Christensen, and Elliott 
2012; Givoly and Palmon 1982), we measure the timeliness of earnings announcements as
_ _ _ _iqt iqt iqtER ANN DELAY ANN lag ANN Expect= − , where _ iq tA N N la g  is the number of 
trading days between the earnings announcement date for firm i in quarter q of fiscal year t and 
the fiscal end date of quarter q, and _ iq tA N N E xp e c t  is the reporting lag in days for the 
corresponding quarter of year t-1.19   
Empirical Models 
Management earnings forecasts  
We employ the following regression equations to estimate the effect of Reg-SHO on the 
likelihood of bad news forecasts (BADNEWS) and the horizon of bad news forecast 
(MF_HORIZON_BAD): 
                                                 
18 We reran our tests with all bad news forecasts, or eliminated firm-quarters with multiple management forecasts. 
The results were qualitatively similar to those we report below. 
19 We also employed a time-series model to estimate the expected earnings announcement lag as in Brown et al. 
(2012). Briefly, we used the median announcement date for each firm quarter as the proxy for the expected 
announcement date and computed the median announcement date for the prior two, three and four years, 
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where itBADNEWS  is an indicator variable equal to one if for firm i there is at least one 
management forecast less than the consensus of analyst forecasts at the time of announcement 
for the quarter and zero otherwise; _ _ itMF HORIZON BAD  is the number of days between the 
forecast date and the fiscal quarter being forecasted, conditional on there being a bad news 
forecast (BADNEWS =1); iPILOT  is an indicator that equals 1 if firm i is in the pilot group and 0 
otherwise; tDURSHO  is an indicator that equals 1 if a quarter is during the period of the Reg-
SHO program and 0 otherwise; tTRANSITION  is an indicator that equals 1 if a quarter is during 
the transition period between the announce ent and implementation of the Reg-SHO program 
and 0 otherwise; tPOSTSHO  is an indicator that equals 1 if a quarter is after the period of the 
Reg-SHO program and 0 otherwise; itCONTROLS  are a set of firm and industry characteristics 
that may affect management forecasts (discussed below). 
The coefficient estimates on  x PILOT DURSHO  in (1) and (2), 6a  and 6b , capture the 
causal effect of the relaxation of short selling constraints via Reg-SHO on the likelihood and 
horizon of bad news forecasts, respectively. Subsequent to August 2007, the Reg-SHO pilot 






Therefore we expect there to be no difference in the likelihood of bad news forecasts, the bad 
news forecast horizon, and the delay in earnings announcements between the pilot group and 
control group during the post-SHO period. To test this we include an interaction term in our 
regressions,  x PILOT POSTSHO , to capture the difference between pilot and control firms in the 
post-SHO period. We include industry and fiscal quarter fixed effects to allow for possible 
differences in disclosure incentives across firm-quarters related to industry and reporting cycle. 
Following prior research, we control for several factors related to managers’ incentives 
for voluntary disclosure. We include firm size (SIZE), measured as the logarithm of market value 
of equity (in millions of dollars) at the beginning of the relevant quarter. Lang and Lundholm 
(1993) and Kasznik and Lev (1995) document a positive association between firm size and the 
frequency of voluntary disclosure. We also consider firms’ underlying performance in 
determining disclosure choices. Prior studies find that firms’ propensity to issue bad news 
forecasts is associated with the underlying earnings news (e.g., Field et al. 2005; Kothari et al. 
2009; Skinner 1994). To control for earnings news, we include a loss indicator, LOSS_D, equal 
to one if actual quarterly earnings is less than zero and zero otherwise, and an unexpected 
earnings indicator, UE_D, equal to one if actual earnings is greater than the analyst consensus 
forecast at the beginning of the quarter and zero otherwise. We also include return on assets 
(ROA) as in Miller (2002). This measure is computed as earnings before extraordinary items 
scaled by lagged total assets at the end of each fiscal quarter. We use the prior quarter stock 
return (CRET) as an additional (lagged) performance measure. CRET is computed as the 90 day 
value-weighted market adjusted return accumulated ending at the previous fiscal quarter-end. We 






as research and development expenditures scaled by total assets at the beginning of the fiscal 
quarter.  
We control for uncertainty associated with and growth of firms’ operations by including 
return volatility (RETVOLATILITY) and the market-to-book ratio (MTB). Firms facing greater 
uncertainty in their future earnings realizations may discourage managers from providing 
earnings forecasts (e.g., Feng and Koch 2010; Graham et al. 2005; Waymire 1985). 
Alternatively, a volatile and fast growth business environment may motivate managers to 
disclose more forecasts to avoid/reduce potential litigation costs (Skinner 1994, 1997). 
RETVOLATILITY is computed as the standard deviation of daily market-adjusted returns during 
a fiscal quarter. MTB is measured as the ratio of market value of equity to book value. 
We include analyst following (LNANALYST) and institutional ownership (INSTITUTION) 
to control for demand for credible earnings guidance from managers. Prior research finds that 
greater analyst following and higher institutional ownership are both associated with more 
disclosure  (Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta 2005; Lang and Lundholm 1996). We use a 
logarithmic transformation of one plus the number of analysts to capture analyst following. 
Institutional ownership is the percentage of aggregated institutionally owned shares over total 
outstanding shares for each quarter, based on data from Form 13F.20 
Finally, prior research suggests that firms’ disclosure policies tend to be “sticky”; that is, 
some firms consistently provide earnings guidance while others rarely do and thus prior forecast 
history is an important determinant of firm’s disclosure policy (e.g., Bushee, Matsumoto, and 
                                                 
20 Because Form 13F is provided every calendar quarter, for each firm whose fiscal quarter does not align with the 
calendar quarter, we round the fiscal quarter to the calendar quarter. For example, if a firm’s fiscal quarter end is 
January 2004, the institutional holdings published in March 2004 is allocated to this firm quarter. In our sample, 






Miller 2003; Graham et al. 2005; Skinner 2003). Following Field et al. (2005) and Cao and 
Narayanamoorthy (2011), we use an indicator variable, MF_D, to capture firms’ past forecasting 
behavior. The indicator variable is equal to 1 if a management forecast was issued in the 
previous quarter and 0 otherwise.21 We expect MF_D to be positively associated with bad news 
disclosure.  
The timeliness of earnings announcements 
We employ the following regression equation to estimate the effect of Reg-SHO on the 
delay in earnings announcements (ER_ANN_DELAY):  
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Where _ _ itER ANN DELAY  is the difference (in trading days) between the earnings 
announcement date and the announcement date from the corresponding quarter in the prior year. 
itCONTROLS  are a set of firm and industry characteristics that prior research suggests are 
associated with earnings announcement timing (discussed below). Industry and fiscal quarter 
fixed effects are also included. The coefficient on  x PILOT DURSHO , 6c , captures the effect 
of Reg-SHO on the delay in earnings announcements.  
Following prior research, we control for several factors that are associated with the delay 
in earnings announcements. Bagnoli et al. (2002) and Brown et al. (2012) document that firms 
with negative news are more likely to delay earnings announcements. Therefore, we control for 
                                                 
21 We also defined MF_D equal to one if the firm issued a management forecast in at least one of the four previous 






earnings surprise, SURPRISE --- the difference between actual earnings and the analyst 
consensus immediately prior to the earnings announcement. We also include an indicator 
variable NEG_SURPRISE_D equal to 1 if SURPRISE is negative and 0 otherwise. Finally, we 
include an indicator variable LOSS_D equal to 1 if actual earnings is negative and 0 otherwise. 
We expect the coefficient on SURPRISE to be negative and coefficients on NEG_SURPRISE_D 
and LOSS_D  to be positive.  
In addition, we control for firm size (SIZE), market to book ratio (MTB), return on assets 
(ROA), institutional ownership (INSTITUTION), computed as in equations (1) and (2). Finally, 
we control for several other determinants of the timing of firms’ earnings announcements, 
including earnings volatility (STDROA), occurrence of one-time events proxied by the reporting 
of special items in Compustat (SPECIAL_D), and an indicator for whether firms provide 
management earnings forecasts (GUIDANCE_D).   STDROA is computed as the standard 
deviation of return on assets over at least three of the past eight quarters. SPECIAL_D is an 
indicator variable set equal to 1 if a firm reports non-zero special items in the current quarter and 
0 otherwise. GUIDANCE_D is an indicator variable set equal to 1 for those firm-quarters with at 
least one outstanding management earnings forecasts as of the earnings announcement date and 0 
otherwise. 
In order to mitigate the effect of extreme observations, we winsorize all continuous 








In Table 2, we provide descriptive statistics comparing the primary research variables 
between pilot and control firms before the announcement of Reg-SHO (Panel A) and during the 
implementation of Reg-SHO (Panel B). Because pilot firms are chosen by (effectively) random 
selection from Russell 3000 index firms there should be no systematic difference between these 
two groups before SHO. However, after requiring relevant data for our tests, there are several 
differences between pilot and control firms before the announcement of Reg-SHO. For instance, 
pilot firms are slightly larger, exhibit higher ROA, have lower market/accounting return 
volatility, are more likely to report special items, and have a longer delay in earnings 
announcements, relative to control firms.22 As a result, we control for these firm-specific 
characteristics in our difference-in-difference analyses.    
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Difference-in-Difference analyses 
The effect of Reg-SHO on the likelihood of bad news management earnings forecasts  
Table 3 presents regression results for the effect of Reg-SHO on the likelihood of bad 
news management forecast disclosure (hypothesis 1). In column (1), based on the full sample,  
the estimated coefficient on  x PILOT DURSHO  is 0.11 (t = 2.31) and statistically significant at 
the five percent level, indicating that pilot firms are more likely to issue bad news earnings 
forecasts during the Reg-SHO period relative to control firms. In terms of economic significance, 
the increase in likelihood of bad news forecast disclosure by pilot firms relative to control firms 
is approximately 5 percent.     
                                                 
22 Systematic differences between pilot and control firms are also observed in Li and Zhang (2015) and He and Tian 
(2014). In addition, the SEC randomly selected pilot firms based upon dollar trading volume one year immediately 
prior to the SHO announcement. If we restrict our pre Reg-SHO sample period to this one year period, the 






As expected, the coefficient on PILOT  column (1) is not significantly different from 
zero, indicating that there is no reliable evidence of a difference between pilot and control firms’ 
disclosure of bad news management forecasts in the pre Reg-SHO period. Nor is there 
significant evidence of a difference in the voluntary disclosure of bad news between pilot and 
control firms in the post Reg-SHO period --- the coefficient on  x PILOT POSTSHO  in column 
(1) is 0.10 (t = 1.49) and not significant at conventional levels. These results reinforce the 
inference that the difference in managerial disclosure behavior between pilot and control firms 
during Reg-SHO is driven by the increase in short selling pressure resulting from the relaxation 
of constraints on short-selling. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
We also investigated whether the increased disclosure of bad news forecasts by pilot 
firms during the Reg-SHO period differs for extreme versus moderate bad news. Extreme bad 
news is likely to be revealed even in the absence of short selling pressure due to the associated 
litigation costs and other factors discussed in section 2. In this case, it is less likely that the 
removal of short selling constraints under Reg-SHO will have an effect on firms’ disclosure of 
bad news. However, for less extreme or moderate bad news the removal of short selling 
constraints is more likely to influence firms’ disclosure decisions at the margin of the cost-
benefit tradeoff for voluntary disclosure. Therefore, we expect that the increased disclosure of 
bad news concentrates in the moderate bad news cases, and has less or no effect for extreme bad 
news cases. To investigate this possibility, we divided the sample of all bad news management 
forecasts into two groups: ‘moderate bad news’ forecasts, which are those where the forecast less 
analyst consensus is above the median (i.e., lower magnitude) for all bad news forecasts, and 






greater magnitude). We then re-estimated equation (1) twice: first where the left-hand side (LHS) 
variable is redefined to be one if the forecast is ‘moderate bad news’ and zero if it is not bad 
(column (2) of Table 3), and then where the LHS is redefined to be one if the forecast is ‘extreme 
bad news’ and zero if it is not bad (column (3) of Table 3). In each case the LHS excludes bad 
news forecasts of the other type: column (2) excludes extreme bad news forecasts and column 
(3) excludes moderate bad news forecasts.  
In column (2), based on moderate bad news forecasts, the coefficient on 
 x PILOT DURSHO  is 0.19 and significantly different from zero (t = 2.76). In contrast, when 
the LHS variable is based on extreme bad news forecasts (column (3)) the coefficient is 0.06 and 
not significantly different from zero at conventional levels (t = 0.63). The results suggest that 
Reg-SHO relaxes the threshold of bad news disclosure, and encourages moderate bad news to be 
released to the market.23 
We also investigated whether the difference in the disclosure of bad news forecasts 
between pilot and control firms during the pilot period is greater for firms facing higher potential 
litigation risk/costs. As discussed in section 2, prior research has suggested that litigation costs 
represent an important cost factor influencing firms’ voluntary disclosure decisions, particularly 
                                                 
23 There are also differences between the likelihood of disclosure of moderate bad news between pilot and control 
firms in each of the pre Reg-SHO, transition, and post Reg-SHO periods apparent in column (2) of Table 3. In the 
pre Reg-SHO period pilot firms disclose moderate bad news less often than control firms (the coefficient on 
PILOT  is significantly negative), but this difference disappears and becomes positive in each of the transition, 
during Reg-SHO, and post Reg-SHO periods. This reinforces the importance of employing a difference-in-
difference research design. Interestingly, the significant and positive coefficient on  x PILOT POSTSHO in column 
(2) of Table 3 suggests that the difference in voluntary disclosure between pilot and control firms persists even after 
the pilot period ended and all firms faced the same short-sales constraints. Because our post Reg-SHO period is 
relatively short, this could be due to gradual transition by control firms to the new regulation. It could also be 
influenced by research design factors. Specifically, the post Reg-SHO period includes the global financial crisis 
(GFC) of late 2008/early 2009. To explore this further we divided the post-Reg SHO period into two sub-periods: 
August 2007 – September 2008, and October 2008 – July 2009. The second of these corresponds to the GFC. Only 
in the second sub-period is there evidence of a difference between the disclosure of bad news between pilot and 
control firms. This suggests that the significant coefficient on  x PILOT POSTSHO in column (2) of Table 3 is 






regarding bad news (e.g., Field et al. 2005; Kothari et al. 2009; Skinner 1994, 1997). This 
suggests that for firms facing a low litigation risk environment, any effects of a change in short 
selling constraints will be muted since there is little scope for already low potential litigation 
costs to be affected. Following prior research (e.g., Field et al. 2005; Skinner 1994, 1997) we 
investigate this possibility by dividing sample firms by industry --- firms with Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes within the ranges 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-
5960, 7371-7379 or 8371-8734 are classified as having high litigation risk/costs, otherwise they 
are considered to face low litigation risk/cost. Columns (4) and (5) of Table 3 present regression 
results for these two groups. In column (4), for firms in high litigation risk industries, the 
coefficient on  x PILOT DURSHO  is 0.21 and statistically significant at the 5% level (t =2.01), 
while in column (5), where litigation risk is low, the coefficient is 0.05 and statistically 
insignificant (t = 0.59). Thus, only for high litigation risk firms do we obtain statistically reliable 
evidence consistent with Reg-SHO increasing the likelihood that firms disclose bad news 
management earnings forecasts.(Kim and Skinner 2012)24 
                                                 
24 We also employed two alternative metrics for litigation risk. The first metric is predicted litigation risk from Kim 
and Skinner (2012)’s model based on firm- and industry-specific information such as prior stock returns, return 
volatility and firm performance. We modified the model to estimate the perceived ex anti litigation risk for our 
sample firms (Yuan and Zhang 2014):  Prob (lawsuiti,t+1=1) = αi,t + β1(Returni,) + β2(Turnoveri,t) + β3 (Return 
volatilityi,t) + β4 (Betai,t) + β5(Skewnessi,t) + β6 (MVEi,t) + β7 (ROAi,t) + β8 (Biotechi,t) + β9 (Electronicsi,t) + β10 
(Computeri,t) + β11 (Retaili,t) + εi,t . The inferences from columns (4) and (5) of Tables 3 and 4 still hold at 
conventional significance levels using this model to divide the sample into high and low litigation risk firm-quarters. 
But in Table 5 (relating to the timing of earnings announcements) hypothesis 3 is not supported using this litigation 
risk approach. One potential explanation is that given that short selling can directly affect firms’ stock returns and 
return volatility, predicted litigation risk using the Kim and Skinner (2012) model is endogenous with short selling 
activities in the prior period. Thus, it is difficult to disentangle causal effects. The second metric we employed is the 
ratio of total lawsuits to the number of firms in an industry (based upon the 2-digit SIC code) 5yrs immediately 
before Reg-SHO (Yuan and Zhang, 2014). The inferences from columns (4) and (5) in Tables 3 and 5 are unaffected 







The effect of Reg-SHO on the timing of bad news earnings forecasts 
Table 4 presents results for the effect of Reg-SHO on the timing of bad news 
management forecasts (hypothesis 2), based on the subsample of firm-quarters where a bad news 
management forecast was released. The LHS variable is measured as the number of days prior to 
the end of the forecasted fiscal quarter that the management forecast was released. In column (2), 
for the full sample, the coefficient estimate on  x PILOT DURSHO  is 1.85 and significant at the 
10% level (t = 1.86). This suggests that managers in the pilot firms issued bad news forecasts 
earlier than those issued by control firms during Reg-SHO, although the result is statistically 
weak. Regarding economic significance, the increase in the horizon difference between pilot and 
control firms of 1.85 days is approximately 5.5% of the mean horizon of bad news forecasts for 
the control firms before Reg-SHO. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Similar to the analysis of the likelihood of bad news forecasts in the previous subsection, 
we separated bad news management forecasts into extreme bad news and moderate bad news 
forecasts. For the subsample based on moderate bad news forecasts (column (2) of Table 4) the 
coefficient on  x PILOT DURSHO  is 2.02 (t = 1.70, significant at the 10% level). In column (3), 
where the subsample is based on extreme bad news forecasts, the coefficient is 1.81 and not 
significant (t= 1.08), suggesting that the difference between pilot and control firms’ forecast 
horizons is more pronounced for moderate bad news forecasts.  
Columns (4) and (5) of Table 4 report results for the high and low litigation risk 
subsamples employed in the previous section. The coefficient on  x PILOT DURSHO  is 3.30 (t 






risk companies the coefficient is 0.99 and not significant (t = 0.88). Thus, consistent with the 
results from Table 3, the difference between pilot and control firms appears to be driven by 
companies that face higher litigation risks/costs. 
The effect of Reg-SHO on the timing of earnings announcements 
In Table 5, we report results regarding the effect of Reg-SHO on the timing of earnings 
announcements (hypothesis 3). Based on the full sample (column (1)), the coefficient on 
 x PILOT DURSHO  is -0.22 (t = -2.04, significant at the 5% level), suggesting that during the 
Reg-SHO pilot period managers in pilot firms move their earnings announcements forward 
(compared with control firms).25 In contrast, in the post Reg-SHO period the coefficient on 
 x PILOT POSTSHO  is not significant (coeff = -0.08, t = -0.89), suggesting that the difference 
between pilot and control firms in the timing of earnings announcement disappears in the post 
Reg-SHO period.26  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
The discussion surrounding hypothesis 3 in section 2 suggests that the potential effect of 
short selling on firms reporting of (mandatory) earnings news is likely to be concentrated in 
situations where the firm reports bad earnings news. To investigate this we partitioned the 
                                                 
25 The coefficient on  x PILOT DURSHO  appears economically small, indicating a change in the difference 
between pilot and control firms of only 0.22 days, on average. As discussed in Brown et al. (2012), this result may 
be attributable to the substantial clustering of announcements around the expected date (i.e., around 
_ _ 0ER ANN DELAY = ). To address this issue, following Brown et al. (2012), we reran our test after eliminating 
observations with an absolute _ _ER ANN DELAY of less than three days (i.e., earnings announcements that are less 
than three days late or less than three days early). The results in the reduced sample exhibit a larger effect for Reg-
SHO ─ the coefficient on  x PILOT DURSHO is -0.65 and significant at the 5% level. 
26 As in Table 4, the coefficient on PILOT in column (1) of Table 5 is statistically significant (coeff = 0.17, t = 
2.24). The positive coefficient indicates that, on average, prior to the Reg-SHO period pilot firms delayed their 
earnings results compared with control firms, consistent with their delay of management earnings forecasts relative 






sample based on earnings news: reported earnings less than (greater than or equal to) the analyst 
consensus forecast at the at the beginning of the quarter is classified as bad (neutral or good) 
news. We expect the effect of Reg-SHO on the timing of earnings announcement to be more 
pronounced in the subsample where the earnings news is bad. Columns (2) and (3) of Table 5 
report results weakly consistent with this expectation. For bad earnings news, the coefficient on 
 x PILOT DURSHO  is -0.31 (t = -1.76, significant at the 10% level). The coefficient is -0.14 and 
insignificant (t = -0.96) for good or neutral news. 
 Columns (4) and (5) of Table 5 present the results for the high and low litigation 
subsamples used in the previous sections. The coefficient on  x PILOT DURSHO  is -0.50 (t = -
2.20), significant at the 5% level for high litigation risk firms, and -0.13 (t= -1.08), insignificant 
for low litigation risk firms. Thus, consistent with the results from Tables 3 and 4, the difference 
between pilot and control firms appears to be attributable to companies that face higher litigation 
risk. 
Additional analyses  
Firms’ prior forecasting behavior 
Previous research (e.g., Billings et al. 2015; Field et al. 2005; Rogers and Van Buskirk 
2013) indicates that firms’ prior forecasting behavior is an important factor in explaining their 
subsequent voluntary forecasting decisions. To investigate the role of prior forecasting behavior 
on our results, we divided our sample into three groups: firms which did not forecast earnings in 
the period prior to the announcement of the Regulation SHO pilot program; firms which issued 
one to three earnings forecasts in the pre-Regulation SHO period; and firms which issued greater 






coefficients and t-statistics associated with  x PILOT DURSHO in equations (1), (2), and (3) 
(corresponding to the analyses in Tables 3, 4 and 5 respectively). Column (1) repeats the results 
from Tables 3-5 for comparison purposes, while columns (2)-(4) provide results for the three 
subsamples based on firms’ prior forecasting behavior. Only firms that already forecasted 
frequently prior to Reg-SHO exhibit significant results (column (4)). This is consistent with 
Regulation SHO only having an impact on firms whose prior forecasting behavior suggests were 
on the margin in terms of the costs and benefits associated with voluntary forecasting. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Association with stock price response to the initial announcement of Reg-SHO 
 Grullon et al. (2015) document a negative short-term cumulative abnormal return around 
the Reg-SHO announcement date for pilot firms.  If Reg-SHO affects managerial disclosure 
behavior, then we expect the effect will be mor  pronounced for those firms which are most 
affected by the regulation, as indicated by larger stock price declines around the Reg-SHO 
announcement date. To investigate this possibility, we partitioned the full sample into two 
groups based on the 12-day cumulative abnormal return around the Reg-SHO announcement. 
Specifically, Reg-SHO was announced on June 28, 2004; the cumulative abnormal return, 
CAR[-10,+1], for each firm was computed  between 10 days before and 1 day after the Reg-SHO 
announcement. We partitioned the sample into firms with a CAR below the median (Low CAR 
firms) and with a CAR above the median (High CAR firms). Low CAR firms are those with the 
greatest magnitude price decline and so are those expected to be most affected by the Reg-SHO 
provisions.27 We repeated our analyses from Tables 3-5 for each subsample. Untabulated results 
                                                 
27 The average CAR is 5.02 percent and -6.56 percent for High and Low CAR firms respectively. The average CAR 






indicate that in all cases only firms who experienced larger magnitude negative stock price 
declines around the announcement of Reg-SHO exhibit significant changes in voluntary 
disclosure behavior by pilot versus control firms during the Reg-SHO period. 
Good news earnings forecasts 
To rule out the possibility that our findings are due to a change in managerial disclosure 
in general (i.e., increases in the likelihood of both good news and bad news forecasts), we also 
investigated the effect of short selling on good news forecasts. We re-estimated equation (1) with 
GOODNEWS as the LHS variable (rather than BADNEWS), and equation (2) with 
MF_HORIZON_GOOD as the LHS variable (rather than MF_HORIZON_BAD). Untabulated 
results indicate there is weak evidence of a decrease in the likelihood of good news management 
forecasts for pilot firms during the Reg-SHO period. This contrasts with the increase in 
likelihood of bad news disclosure reported in Table 3. The results also indicate no significant 
effect of Reg-SHO on the timing of good news forecasts by pilot versus control firms, contrary 
to the results for the timing of bad news forecasts in Table 4. Thus, it is unlikely that the results 
reported in Tables 3 and 4 reflect a general change i  the voluntary disclosure behavior of pilot 
firms. Instead, they relate specifically to bad news disclosure and are consistent with being 
driven by the changes in short selling constraints introduced by Reg-SHO. 
Bundled management forecasts 
 Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013) show that the traditional measure of management 
forecast news contains error due to the bundling of current quarter earnings announcements with 
management forecasts for the next quarter. The majority of management forecasts in our sample 
are bundled with earnings announcements, leading to a potential measurement error in the 






management forecast news by substituting the conditional analyst consensus forecast (to 
earnings announcements) for the unconditional consensus forecasts used in the traditional 
calculation of management forecast news. Untabulated results indicate that all of our results are 
robust to this redefinition of forecast news. 
Correlation of management forecasts horizon and earnings announcement delay 
Because the majority of management forecasts are bundled with earnings announcements, 
our finding of a decrease in bad news forecast horizons might be due to a reduction in delay of 
earnings announcements. To mitigate this possibility, we included an indicator variable in our 
regressions to control for this bundling effect. Following Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013), we 
defined the indicator variable as equal to 1 if management forecasts fall within two days of the 
earnings announcement date and 0 otherwise. Untabulated results indicate that all of our results 
are robust to this check. 
Pseudo pilot firms and pseudo Reg-SHO pilot program period 
Following He and Tian (2014), we ran simulations to create pseudo pilot firms and a 
pseudo pilot program period to address the possibility that our results may simply be due to 
chance. Specifically, we randomized one third of firms into a pseudo pilot group and the rest 
were assigned to the control group in the quarter immediately before the Reg-SHO 
announcement (July 2004). Using this bootstrapped sample, we estimated equations (1)-(3) and 
repeated the simulation 5000 times. The original coefficients on the likelihood (0.11 in Table 3) 
and horizon of bad news forecasts (1.85 in Table 4) as well as that of the delay of earnings 






simulated distribution of the coefficients on  x PILOT DURSHO , which is inconsistent with our 
findings in Tables 3-5 being generated by chance.   
To address the concern that our findings are driven by an unrecognised bias in our 
research design we also conducted a placebo test by taking the pilot firms identified by SEC to a 
“pseudo Reg-SHO” period, July 2003, that is one year before the official Reg-SHO period. 
Untabulated findings indicate that the coefficients on  x PILOT DURSHO  in all three models 
are insignificant at conventional levels, which suggests our inferences in Tables 3-5 are not 
driven by unobservable confounding factors within our research design. 
Impact of external financing on the effect of short selling 
We also investigated the potential influence of firms’ external financing needs on the 
effect of short selling. Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1991) show that firms’ earnings news 
contains more good news before seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) than after SEOs, which is 
consistent with the findings of Asquith and Mullins (1986) that there is on average a stock price 
run-up preceding equity issuance, and suggests that firms may withhold bad news disclosure 
prior to issuing equity. Grullon et al. (2015) document that pilot firms significantly reduce equity 
issuance during the Reg-SHO period and hence it is possible that the reduced withholding of bad 
news we document simply reflects the changes in the difference between pilot and control firms’ 
equity issuance. We investigated this possibility by partitioning sample firms based on whether 
firms issue equity in the year subsequent to disclosure/non-disclosure. Firms were classified as 
equity issuers if they issued equity and non-equity issuers if they did not, as recorded in the 






Untabulated results show that our main findings—more likely and timelier disclosure of 
bad news by pilot firms — hold in the subsample comprised of non-equity issuers, and suggests 
our inferences in Tables 3-5 are not driven by the previously documented changing trend in 
equity issuance.  
CONCLUSION 
In this study, we investigate how short selling pressure affects firms’ voluntary disclosure 
of bad news. As informed traders, short sellers enhance the informativeness of stock prices, 
potentially decreasing the benefits and increasing the costs to managers from withholding and/or 
delaying the release of bad news. We employ a quasi-natural experiment — the relaxation of 
short selling constraints for a pilot group of firms under Reg-SHO — to investigate this 
possibility. Relative to control firms, we observe a significant increase in the likelihood of bad 
news management forecasts among pilot firms. In addition, pilot firms also provide these 
forecasts in a more timely fashion. We also find that pilot firms accelerate the release of 
quarterly earnings news when the news is bad. We further find that Reg-SHO lifts the threshold 
of bad news disclosure by encouraging more timely disclosure of moderate bad news, and that 
the effect of Reg-SHO on the disclosure of bad news is more significant when litigation risk is 
higher.  
Overall, our results are consistent with results from related research (e.g., Chang et al. 
2014; Fang et al. 2016; He and Tian 2014; Hope et al. 2017; Karpoff and Lou 2010; Ke et al. 
2018; Massa et al. 2015b), showing that short selling has real effects on corporate decisions, and 







However, our results are inconsistent to some extent with some of the results reported in 
Li and Zhang (2015) who use a similar research design and sample. Specifically, they report that 
pilot firms decrease the precision of range bad news earnings forecasts and decrease the 
readability of bad news annual reports (compared with control firms) during the Reg-SHO 
period. That is, their results suggest that Reg-SHO discouraged the transparent disclosure of bad 
news earnings forecasts, whereas our results indicate it increased the likelihood of bad news 
forecast disclosure and accelerated its timing. This suggests a need for further future research to 
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Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
BADNEWS = an indicator variable equal to 1 if there is at least one management forecast less than 
the consensus of analyst forecasts at the time of announcement for each fiscal 
period and 0 otherwise; 
MF_HORIZON_BAD = the number of days between the forecast date and the end date of a fiscal period 
being forecasted (conditional on BADNEWS=1); 
ER_ANN_DELAY = the firm's deviation from its expected announcement date, assumed to be the same 
as the reporting lag in days for the corresponding quarter of year t-1; 
CRET = market (value-weighted) adjusted daily returns over the previous quarter, computed 
at the beginning of a fiscal quarter; 
GUIDANCE_D = an indicator variable equal to 1 for those firm-quarters with at least one outstanding 
management earnings forecast as of the earnings announcement date based on the 
I/B/E/S guidance feed database and 0 otherwise. 
ROA = earnings before extraordinary items scaled by lagged total assets in current quarter; 
RETVOLATILITY = standard deviation of market (value-weighted) adjusted daily returns over past 
quarter, computed at the beginning of a fiscal quarter; 
RD = research and development expenditures scaled by total asset, computed at the 
beginning of a fiscal quarter; 
INSTITUTION = percentage of institutional ownership over outstanding shares over past quarter, 
computed at the beginning of a fiscal quarter. If missing institution data, 0 will be 
assigned; 
LNANALYST = logarithm of one plus the number of analyst following, computed at the beginning 
of a fiscal quarter; 
LOSS_D = an indicator variable equal to 1 if actual EPS is negative and 0 otherwise; 
MF_D = an indicator variable equal to 1 if a management forecast was issued in the previous 
quarter and 0 otherwise; 
MTB = ratio of market value of equity to book value at the beginning of a fiscal quarter; 
NEG_SURPRISE_D = an indicator variable equal to 1 if actual EPS minus analyst consensus of forecasts is 
negative and 0 otherwise; 
SIZE = logarithm of the market value of equity at the beginning of a fiscal quarter; 
SPECIAL_D = an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm reports non-zero special items in quarter 
q and 0 otherwise; 
STDROA = standard deviation of returns on assets over at least three of the previous eight 
quarters, computed at the beginning of the quarter; 
SURPRISE = analyst forecast error, computed as the difference between actual EPS and analyst 
consensus of forecasts at the time of earnings announcement; 
UE_D = an indicator variable equal to 1 if analyst consensus at the beginning of the quarter t 











Firms included in the Russel 3000 index in 2004 2998
Less: 
 Firms not listed on NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq, or firms with IPOs after April 30, 2004 
 Firms without required financial and stock price 







 Pilot firms 





Final firm-quarter observations for Hypotheses H1  55127
Final firm-quarter observations for Hypotheses H2  9687
Final firm-quarter observations for Hypotheses H3 
 
 53787 




Panel B: Industry distribution  
 






Business Services  291 10.4 85 206 
Depository Institutions  270 9.6 76 194 
Chemicals and Allied Products  214 7.6 76 138 
Electronic & Other Electrical 
Equipment  
209 7.4 68 141 
Holding and Other Investment Offices  152 5.4 60 92 
Measuring, Photographic & Medical  145 5.2 50 95 
Industrial and Commercial Machinery  134 4.8 40 94 
Insurance Carriers  101 3.6 27 74 
Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services  99 3.5 38 61 
Communications  89 3.2 20 69 
Engineering, Accounting and 
Research  
76 2.7 25 51 
Oil and Gas Extraction  72 2.6 21 51 
Health Services  56 2.0 12 44 
Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods  53 1.9 24 29 
Miscellaneous Retail  50 1.8 18 32 
Transportation Equipment  48 1.7 15 33 
Food and Kindred Products  45 1.6 17 28 
Security & Commodity Brokers and 
Dealers  
37 1.3 14 23 
Apparel and Accessory Stores  36 1.3 13 23 
Primary Metal Industries  36 1.3 16 20 
Printing, Publishing and Allied 
Industry  
36 1.3 13 23 
Eating and Drinking Places  34 1.2 11 23 
Wholesale Trade - Nondurable Goods  34 1.2 13 21 
Fabricated Metal Products  28 1.0 11 17 
Others  462 16.5 156 306 
     






Panel A: Summary statistics for sample firm-quarters before the Reg-SHO announcement 
  
pilot group control group Test for difference 
 (pilot-control) 
# obs. Mean std. dev. Median # 
obs. 
Mean std. dev. Median t-stat Wilcoxon 
 z-stat 
BADNEWS 4806 0.18 0.38 0.00 9898 0.18 0.38 0.00 0.10 0.10
MF_HORIZON_BAD 841 32.32 20.22 41.00 1729 33.49 19.77 42.00 -1.40 -1.76
ER_ANN_DELAY 4817 0.01 4.09 -1.00 9887 -0.15 4.24 -1.00 2.19 1.47
SIZE 4806 6.98 1.47 6.75 9898 6.93 1.48 6.70 1.89 2.41
LNANALYST 4806 1.55 0.66 1.39 9898 1.55 0.65 1.61 -0.31 -0.79
MTB 4806 3.05 3.27 2.10 9898 2.95 3.38 2.10 1.69 1.86
ROA 4806 0.01 0.04 0.01 9898 0.01 0.04 0.01 2.35 4.01
CRET 4806 0.01 0.11 0.01 9898 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.24 0.51
RETVOLATILITY 4806 0.02 0.01 0.02 9898 0.02 0.01 0.02 -2.38 -1.33
RD 4806 0.01 0.02 0.00 9898 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.17 -0.82
INSTITUTION 4806 0.53 0.32 0.59 9898 0.52 0.33 0.59 0.89 0.19
UE_D 4806 0.41 0.49 0.00 9898 0.40 0.49 0.00 0.68 0.68
LOSS_D 4806 0.14 0.35 0.00 9898 0.15 0.36 0.00 -1.50 -1.50
MF_D 4806 0.24 0.42 0.00 9898 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.70 0.70
FE 4690 0.06 0.72 0.05 9600 0.07 0.79 0.05 -1.13 -1.49
NEG_FE_D 4817 0.28 0.45 0.00 9887 0.28 0.45 0.00 0.48 0.48
STDROA 4817 0.02 0.04 0.01 9887 0.02 0.06 0.01 -3.50 -1.83
SPECIAL_D 4817 0.99 0.08 1.00 9887 0.99 0.10 1.00 2.36 2.36








Panel B: Summary statistics for sample firm-quarters during the Reg-SHO implementation 
  
pilot group control group Test for difference 
 (pilot-control) 
# obs. Mean std. dev. Median # obs. Mean std. dev. Median t-stat Wilcoxon 
z-stat 
BADNEWS 6260 0.18 0.39 0.00 12746 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.74 1.74
MF_HORIZON_BAD 1147 37.15 16.15 42.00 2216 36.09 17.59 43.00 1.71 0.60
ER_ANN_DELAY 6327 0.83 4.10 0.00 12899 0.85 3.99 0.00 -0.32 0.40
SIZE 6260 7.41 1.43 7.24 12746 7.31 1.47 7.12 4.52 4.90
LNANALYST 6260 1.71 0.64 1.61 12746 1.69 0.65 1.61 1.49 1.39
MTB 6260 3.18 3.09 2.37 12746 3.28 3.44 2.39 -1.93 -0.56
ROA 6260 0.01 0.04 0.01 12746 0.01 0.04 0.01 2.77 4.01
CRET 6260 0.00 0.08 0.00 12746 0.00 0.08 0.00 -0.57 -0.80
RETVOLATILITY 6260 0.02 0.01 0.01 12746 0.02 0.01 0.01 -2.77 -2.99
RD 6260 0.01 0.02 0.00 12746 0.01 0.02 0.00 -3.28 -2.74
INSTITUTION 6260 0.62 0.34 0.71 12746 0.62 0.35 0.71 0.94 0.34
UE_D 6260 0.46 0.50 0.00 12746 0.46 0.50 0.00 0.60 0.60
LOSS_D 6260 0.12 0.32 0.00 12746 0.13 0.33 0.00 -1.52 -1.52
MF_D 6260 0.27 0.44 0.00 12746 0.26 0.44 0.00 0.59 0.59
FE 6199 0.03 0.74 0.04 12588 0.03 0.80 0.04 -0.20 -0.75
NEG_FE_D 6327 0.33 0.47 0.00 12899 0.33 0.47 0.00 0.37 0.37
STDROA 6327 0.01 0.02 0.01 12899 0.01 0.03 0.01 -2.94 -0.15
SPECIAL_D 6327 0.99 0.10 1.00 12899 0.99 0.10 1.00 0.68 0.68
GUIDANCE_D 6327 0.28 0.45 0.00 12899 0.27 0.45 0.00 0.75 0.75
 
The sample comprises firm-quarters before the announcement of Reg-SHO (12/01/2002 - 07/28/2004) in Panel A and during the implementation 
of Reg-SHO (05/02/2005-07/06/2007) in Panel B. The pilot group comprises Russell 3000 components that are on the pilot list of Reg-SHO in 
June 2004. The control group comprises all other firms in the Russell 3000. Mean differences from zero in variables between pilot and control 
groups (assumed independent samples) are tested using a two-sample t-test (unpaired) and Wilcoxon Rank sum test. Variables definitions are 





The effect of Reg-SHO on the likelihood of bad news forecasts 
  Full 
sample 
Subsamples 













 Predicted  
sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
Intercept  -4.08*** -4.84*** -4.22*** -4.12*** -3.89***
  (-7.04) (-7.31) (-6.97) (-12.26) (-6.89) 
PILOT  -0.08 -0.11** -0.07 -0.00 -0.10* 
  (-1.61) (-2.34) (-0.79) (-0.02) (-1.68) 
TRANSITION  -0.27*** -0.32*** -0.24** -0.29*** -0.24** 
  (-2.74) (-3.02) (-2.49) (-3.21) (-2.16) 
DURSHO  -0.38*** -0.43*** -0.33*** -0.25*** -0.43***
  (-3.88) (-3.93) (-3.49) (-2.63) (-4.05) 
POSTSHO  -0.41*** -0.37*** -0.44*** -0.42*** -0.37***
  (-3.63) (-3.12) (-3.66) (-3.89) (-3.03) 
PILOT×TRANSITION  0.04 0.19*** -0.01 0.28*** -0.13***
  (0.87) (3.81) (-0.12) (3.49) (-2.79) 
PILOT×DURSHO + (H1) 0.11** 0.19*** 0.06 0.21** 0.05 
  (2.31) (2.76) (0.63) (2.01) (0.59) 
PILOT×POSTSHO  0.10 0.22*** 0.02 0.28** -0.01 
  (1.49) (2.61) (0.22) (2.25) (-0.12) 
SIZE  0.05** 0.15*** -0.12*** 0.06* 0.04 
  (2.23) (6.02) (-4.09) (1.85) (1.36) 
LNANALYST  0.19*** 0.15*** 0.27*** 0.13** 0.24***
  (6.02) (3.23) (6.25) (2.13) (5.39) 
MTB  -0.01** 0.01 -0.04*** -0.02 -0.01 
  (-2.02) (0.95) (-4.42) (-1.41) (-1.33) 
ROA  -0.02 0.56 -0.63 1.24 -0.84 
  (-0.04) (0.64) (-0.86) (1.28) (-1.36) 
CRET  -0.06 0.00 -0.27 -0.30 0.14 
  (-0.31) (0.02) (-1.31) (-1.16) (0.60) 
RETVOLATILITY  -9.48*** -10.31*** -9.39*** -1.29 -14.43***
  (-5.43) (-4.15) (-4.77) (-0.52) (-6.76) 
RD  -0.23 -0.52 1.63 1.05 -2.32 
  (-0.18) (-0.27) (1.03) (0.64) (-1.16) 
INSTITUTION  0.11 0.06 0.14* 0.23** 0.05 
  (1.58) (0.70) (1.82) (2.16) (0.61) 
LOSS_D  -0.17** -0.94*** -0.05 -0.04 -0.26***
  (-2.48) (-7.72) (-0.62) (-0.50) (-2.94) 
UE_D  1.23*** 0.59*** 2.16*** 1.32*** 1.17***
  (36.46) (13.35) (38.87) (18.62) (31.01) 
MF_D  2.75*** 2.74*** 2.60*** 2.65*** 2.79***
  (21.16) (21.18) (18.94) (19.29) (20.31) 







The sample period spans the pre Reg-SHO period (PRESHO), the transition period (TRANSITION), the 
during Reg-SHO period (DURSHO), and the post Reg-SHO period (POSTSHO). The LHS variable is 
BADNEWS, defined as one if there is at least one management forecast less than the consensus of analyst 
forecasts at the time of announcement for each fiscal period and zero otherwise. The coefficients are 
estimated using logit with industry fixed effects and fiscal quarter fixed effects. In Columns (2) and (3) 
we divided the sample of all bad news management forecasts into two groups: ‘moderate bad news’ 
forecasts, which are those where the forecast less analyst consensus is above the median (i.e., lower 
magnitude) for all bad news forecasts, and ‘extreme bad news’ forecasts where the forecast less analyst 
consensus is below the median (i.e., greater magnitude). We then re-estimated the regression twice: first 
where the LHS variable is redefined to be one if the forecast is ‘moderate bad news’ and zero if it is not 
bad (column (2)), and then where the LHS is redefined to be one if the forecast is ‘extreme bad news’ and 
zero if it is not bad (column (3)). In each case the LHS excludes bad news forecasts of the opposite type: 
column (2) excludes extreme bad news forecasts from the estimation sample and column (3) excludes 
moderate bad news forecasts. In Columns (4) and (5) the regression is estimated separately for 
subsamples of firms with high litigation risk or low litigation risk. A firm is considered to have high 
litigation risk if its Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes falls within 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 
3600-3674, 5200-5960, 7371-7379 or 8371-8734. Otherwise, it is considered to have low litigation risk. 
***, ** and * indicate significance of coefficient at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, based on firm 
and year-quarter clustered standard errors. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
  







The effect of Reg-SHO on the horizon of bad news forecasts 
 
 
  Full sample Subsamples 
   Moderate 









 Predicted  
sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept  26.22*** 21.14*** 25.02** 28.97*** 27.33*** 
  (11.13) (10.63) (2.47) (8.31) (8.95) 
PILOT  -1.70** -1.76 -1.69 -1.73 -1.93* 
  (-2.00) (-1.54) (-1.51) (-1.39) (-1.91) 
TRANSITION  -4.62 -2.27 -5.20* -5.88** -4.05 
  (-1.64) (-1.03) (-1.71) (-2.37) (-1.27) 
DURSHO  -1.95 0.43 -2.26 -2.61* -1.80 
  (-1.21) (0.32) (-1.15) (-1.67) (-0.99) 
POSTSHO  -0.03 1.11 1.00 -2.78 1.32 
  (-0.02) (0.82) (0.51) (-1.46) (0.83) 
PILOT×TRANSITION  1.34 0.78 2.31 2.63 0.50 
  (0.97) (0.43) (1.38) (1.41) (0.35) 
PILOT×DURSHO + (H2) 1.85* 2.02* 1.81 3.30** 0.99 
  (1.86) (1.70) (1.08) (1.96) (0.88) 
PILOT×POSTSHO  0.78 2.02 -0.65 3.08** -0.27 
  (0.71) (1.52) (-0.47) (2.09) (-0.22) 
SIZE  0.88*** 1.01*** 0.40 1.28*** 0.54 
  (3.05) (3.32) (0.93) (3.53) (1.55) 
LNANALYST  0.34 -0.86 1.17 0.25 0.55 
  (0.63) (-1.64) (1.39) (0.32) (0.84) 
MTB  0.28*** 0.24*** 0.22* 0.05 0.32*** 
  (3.82) (2.86) (1.85) (0.30) (3.74) 
ROA  -9.86* 5.88 -11.33* -27.24*** 4.34 
  (-1.80) (0.41) (-1.76) (-2.65) (0.47) 
CRET  -0.80 0.88 -1.24 1.89 -2.56 
  (-0.38) (0.28) (-0.45) (0.70) (-0.91) 
RETVOLATILITY  -48.29 -114.37** -14.68 -24.53 -83.92** 
  (-1.45) (-2.50) (-0.44) (-0.61) (-2.20) 
RD  73.42*** 38.19** 74.52*** 38.32* 93.03*** 
  (4.96) (2.17) (3.03) (1.82) (3.90) 
INSTITUTION  -0.68 0.75 -1.53 -2.00* 0.39 
  (-0.86) (0.84) (-1.57) (-1.67) (0.39) 
LOSS_D  -5.66*** -1.97 -5.54*** -4.83*** -6.61*** 
  (-7.31) (-1.37) (-6.84) (-4.03) (-6.49) 
UE_D  -4.91*** -3.45*** -8.18*** -4.15*** -5.21*** 
  (-8.26) (-7.78) (-8.74) (-4.82) (-8.90) 
MF_D  6.41*** 1.50* 6.66*** 5.54*** 6.90*** 
  (5.98) (1.73) (6.12) (4.87) (5.67) 
N  9687 4984 5201 3424 6263 






The sample period spans the pre Reg-SHO period (PRESHO), the transition period (TRANSITION), the 
during Reg-SHO period (DURSHO), and the post Reg-SHO period (POSTSHO). The LHS variable is 
MF_HORIZON_BAD, defined as the number of days between the forecast date and the fiscal quarter 
being forecasted, conditional on there being a bad news forecast. The coefficients are estimated using 
OLS with industry fixed effects and fiscal quarter fixed effects. In Columns (2) and (3) we divided the 
sample of all bad news management forecasts into two groups: ‘moderate bad news’ forecasts, which are 
those where the forecast less analyst consensus is above the median (i.e., lower magnitude) for all bad 
news forecasts, and ‘extreme bad news’ forecasts where the forecast less analyst consensus is below the 
median (i.e., greater magnitude). We then re-estimated the regression twice: first where the LHS variable 
is redefined to be one if the forecast is ‘moderate bad news’ and zero if it is not bad (column (2)), and 
then where the LHS is redefined to be one if the forecast is ‘extreme bad news’ and zero if it is not bad 
(column (3)). In each case the LHS excludes bad news forecasts of the opposite type: column (2) excludes 
extreme bad news forecasts from the estimation sample and column (3) excludes moderate bad news 
forecasts. In Columns (4) and (5) the regression is estimated separately for subsamples of firms with high 
litigation risk or low litigation risk. A firm is considered to have high litigation risk if its Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes falls within 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5960, 7371-
7379 or 8371-8734. Otherwise, it is considered to have low litigation risk. t-statistics are in parentheses. 
***, ** and * indicate significance of coefficient at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, based on firm 








The effect of Reg-SHO on the timing of earnings announcements 
  Full 
Sample 
Subsample 
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N  53787 24229 29558 12674 41113 







The sample period spans the pre Reg-SHO period (PRESHO), the transition period (TRANSITION), the during 
Reg-SHO period (DURSHO), and the post Reg-SHO period (POSTSHO). The LHS variable is 
ER_ANN_DELAY, the firm's deviation from its expected earnings announcement lag (assumed to be the same as 
the reporting lag in trading days for the corresponding quarter of year t-1). The regression is estimated using 
OLS with industry fixed effects and fiscal quarter fixed effected included. In columns 2 and 3 the sample is 
partitioned into bad and non-bad earnings news, the difference between actual EPS and the analyst consensus at 
the beginning of the quarter. In columns 4 and 5 the regression is estimated separately for subsamples of firms 
with high litigation risk or low litigation risk. A firm is considered to have high litigation risk if its Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes falls within 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5960, 7371-7379 or 
8371-8734. Otherwise it is considered to have low litigation risk. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance of coefficient at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, based on firm and year-quarter 








The impact of firms’ voluntary disclosure behaviour on the effect of Reg-SHO on likelihood of bad 
news forecasts, horizon of bad news forecasts, and timing of earnings announcements 
 
The sample period spans the pre Reg-SHO period (PRESHO), the transition period (TRANSITION), the 
during Reg-SHO period (DURSHO), and the post Reg-SHO period (POSTSHO). We divided our sample 
into three groups: firms which did not forecast earnings in the period prior to the announcement of the 
Regulation SHO pilot program; firms which issued less than or equal to three earnings forecasts in the 
pre-Regulation SHO period; and firms which issued greater than three earnings forecasts in the pre-
Regulation SHO period. The table reports estimated coefficients and t-statistics associated with 
 x PILOT DURSHO in equations (1), (2), and (3) (corresponding to the analyses in tables 3, 4 and 5 
respectively). Column (1) repeats the results from tables 3-5 for comparison purposes, while columns (2)-
(4) provide results for the three subsamples based on firms’ prior forecasting behavior.  Control variables 
are included (but not reported) as in the equations (1), (2) and (3), respectively. Industry fixed effect and 
fiscal quarter fixed effects are included in all models. T-statistics are in parentheses and are based on firm 
and year-quarter clustered standard errors. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
 
 Full sample No management 








forecast in the 
Pre-SHO period 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Likelihood of bad 
news forecast 
regression 
 
0.11 
(2.28) 
-0.13 
(-0.75) 
-0.09 
(-0.59) 
0.25 
(2.11) 
Forecast horizon 
regression 
 
1.85 
(1.86) 
2.02 
(1.45) 
-0.22 
(-0.17) 
2.92 
(2.20) 
Timing of 
earnings 
announcement 
regression 
 
-0.22 
(-2.04) 
-0.16 
(-0.93) 
0.04 
(0.18) 
-0.60 
(-2.47) 
